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INTRODUCTION
The extent to which patent protection should be extended to
pharmaceuticals has always been and continues to be an issue that
stirs public debate and discussion.' Developing countries and non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") argue that strict enforcement
of pharmaceutical patent holders' rights has resulted in high prices,
which render unaffordable to poor countries drugs critical to the
treatment of epidemics.' The concern stems from the fact that the
1. See generally Amol Sharma, Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha
Developing Countries Seek Amendment to WTO Drug Patent Guidelines, EARTII
TIMES (reporting that access to life-saving patented pharmaceuticals remain
"among the most contentious issues for discussion at the upcoming World Trade
Organization (WTO) meeting in Doha, Quatar .... ), at
http://www.earthtimes.org/nov/worldtradeorgfourthnov3_01.htm (last visited July
11,2002).
2. See, e.g., MEDECINS SANS FRONTIRES CAMPAIGN FOR ACCESS TO
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH: THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN
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patent holders' rights exclude others from selling or making their
exact or substantially similar patented products for the term of the
patent.
3
This period of exclusivity provides the patent holder with the
power to control the selling price of the patented product.- Critics
contend that pharmaceutical companies, as patent holders, have
abused this right in order to reap tremendous profits, despite a
staggering loss of human life.' In response, proponents of strong
patent rights assert that patents are not the major barrier to access to
essential medicines; rather inaccessibility to critical medications
results from inadequate infrastructure, absence of an effective drug
distribution system, and poverty.6
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter M1-DECINS SANS
FRONTI-RES] (arguing that if patent laws were relaxed, the suffering of millions of
people due to infectious diseases worldwide would be lessened), at
http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/upload/ReportsandPublications/291020011614133/DOHACOL.PDF (last
visited July 11, 2002); Rosemary Sweeney, The U.S. Push for Worldwide Patent
Protection for Drugs Meets the AIDS Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating Collision,
9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 445, 447 (2000) (describing citizens of Thailand and
NGOs as seeking relaxed patent laws in an effort to achieve a reduction in the cost
of AIDS drugs).
3. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 844 (3d ed. 1995)
(providing a general introduction to intellectual property rights and policies and
explaining that the "granting of a patent confers upon the inventor a number of
rights, including the right to prevent others from copying and selling the invention
for a specified number of years").
4. See id. at 845 (stating that a patent holder "will tend to charge a monopoly
price over the life of the patent, thus introducing the distortion of monopoly pricing
into the economy").
5. See Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing
Countries, 3 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2001) ("In the health sector,
where denial of affordable access to treatment or pharmaceuticals can have life-or-
death consequences, the conditions, including price, that determine access to
medicines are critical matters, especially for the low-income segments of the
population"); Rosalyn S. Park, Note, The International Drug lndustry: What the
Future Holds for South Africa's HIV/AIDS Patients, II MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
125, 131 (2002) (displaying statistics of the disproportionate negative impact of
drug patents on developing countries). The author contrasts an estimated S3.5 to
$10.8 billion welfare loss experienced by developing nations, with a S2.1 to S 14.4
billion gain to foreign pharmaceutical companies. Id.
6. See Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral
Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAIA 1886, 1886
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Consider the example of sub-Saharan Africa, with nearly twenty-
five million people infected with HIV/AIDS.7 The situation has
become one of the greatest public health challenges in the history of
mankind.8 This area of the world now contains more than seventy
percent of the world's new AIDS cases. 9
While the optimal way to address the AIDS/HIV crisis is to attack
the root of the problem by reducing the rate of HIV infection,10 the
short-term solution lies with drug therapies that increase the life
expectancy of those suffering from the disease. I The tragedy is that
of the nearly 25 million people infected only about 25,000 people, at
most, have access to life-prolonging medicines. 12
(2001) (concluding that patents and patent laws do not operate as the sole, major
barriers to the treatment of AIDS in Africa). The authors stated:
[A] variety of de facto barriers are more responsible for impeding access to
antiretroviral treatment, including but not limited to the poverty of African
countries, the high cost of antiretroviral treatment, national regulatory
requirements for medicines, tariffs and sales taxes, and, above all, a lack of
sufficient international financial aid to fund antiretroviral treatment.
Id.
7. See JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, AIDS EmIDEMIC
UPDATE: DECEMBER 2000 5 (2000) (stating statistics that show 25.3 million adults
and children live with HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa), available at
http://www.unaids.org/wac/2000/wad00/files/WAD-epidemic-report. PDF (last
visited July I1, 2002).
8. See Former Vice President Al Gore, Remarks before the U.N. Security
Council Session on AIDS in Africa (Jan. 10, 2000) (recognizing that AIDS in
Africa has become "not just a humanitarian crisis," but also a "security crisis"), at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/health/0001 10_gore-hiv-aids.html (last
visited July 11, 2002).
9. See Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Examining Global Access to Essential
Pharmaceuticals in the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South African
Example, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 137, 139 (2001) (stating the disproportionate
number of AIDS cases in Sub-Saharan Africa compared with its relatively small
population).
10. See id. at 140 (observing that the ability of a country to address HIV/AIDS
lies with its ability to address the rate of infection). Death most often results from
an individual's inability to receive adequate health care services. Id.
11. See id. (noting that top drug treatments and a high standard of living allow
AIDS/HIV sufferers in the United States to live longer lives).
12. See WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Overview of Developments in the
International Trading Environment: Annual Report by the Director-General,
WT/TPR/OV/7 at 72 (Dec. 10, 2001) (stating that between 10,000 and 25,000
people have access to essential AIDS medicines). The report declares that a
1302 [17:1299
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Consequently, in a continent where the death count from AIDS
threatens to rival that of the plague of 1937," governments have
sought to provide this access to pharmaceuticals by enacting
legislation based on a legal theory known as compulsory licensing."4
In essence, compulsory licensing is when a government compels the
license of a patented product. 5 Developing country governments
increasingly view this form of licensing as a necessary practice to
ensure access to essential medications and to properly address the
AIDS pandemic. 16
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPs"), 17 part of the Uruguay Round of trade agreements
general consensus has been reached by the World Health Organization ("WHO"),
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS ("UNAIDS"), and several other
U.N. agencies, in identifying four components of a viable framework necessary for
increased access to essential medicines. Id. Those components are the following:
rational selection of pharmaceuticals; affordable prices of drugs; sustainable and
adequate financing; and reliable health care and supply systems. Id. See also
WHO, DRUG MANAGEMENT AND SUPPLY STRATEGIES (providing that one-third of
the world population does not have access to medical supplies and ninety-five
percent of those suffering from AIDS do not receive any form of HIV/AIDS
treatment), at
http://www.who.int/medicines/teams/par/drug-management-and_s
upply-strat.html (last visited July 11, 2002).
13. See What is the United States' Role in Combating the Global HI V/AIDS
Epidemic: Hearing before the House Subcomm. On Criminal Justice, Drig Policy
and Human Resources, Comm. On Government Reform, 106th Cong. 152 (1999)
(statement of James Love, Director Consumer Project on Technology) (attempting
to place in historical perspective the large number of AIDS related deaths expected
to occur in Sub-Saharan Africa).
14. See generally Paying for AIDS. NEWSWEEK INT'L, Mar. 19, 2001
(discussing South Africa's 1997 Medicines Act amendment as an example of a law
African governments are enacting to legalize compulsory licensing and parallel
trade) available at 2001 WL 8109129.
15. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW
§ 19.2 (1998) (stating that compulsory licensing is a "governmental requirement
that a patent owner permit another to perform otherwise infringing acts").
16. See Sara M. Ford, Note, Compulsor, Licensing Provisions Under the
TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patients, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941,
946 (2000) (noting that developing countries are keen to utilize compulsory
licensing as a means to provide essential medications to their citizens).
17. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33
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establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),8 is the most
comprehensive international agreement regarding intellectual
property that is currently in force.19 TRIPs outlines a framework for
minimum intellectual property standards that bind all WTO Member
("Member") nations. 20 As part of this framework, TRIPs clearly
authorizes Member countries to legislate exceptions to the rights of'
legitimate patent holders.21 However, the text of TRIPs contained
ambiguities that required clarification.22 Specifically, WTO Members
sought guidance in the area of compulsory licensing.23
One purpose of the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in
Doha, Qatar in November 2001 ("Doha Conference" or "Doha") was
to reduce any ambiguities relating to the compulsory licensing
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs] (establishing minimum standards for the
intellectual property laws of Members).
18. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], art. XI, XII, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1126 (1994) (requiring
all ratifying Members to accept agreements settled at the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations). Between 1986 and 1994, the negotiators at the Uruguay round
created an intergovernmental organization (the WTO) that would embody and
establish the principles of the previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
relating to the trade in goods while adding agreements on trade in services, trade-
related intellectual property, dispute settlement, and other supplemental
agreements. See generally RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW §
4 (a) - (b) (1st ed. 1998) (explaining the creation of the WTO and its mandate).
19. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPs AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 1-22
(2000) [hereinafter CORREA, TRIPS POLICY] (noting that TRIPs is the current
international agreement dealing with virtually all types of intellectual property
rights).
20. See WTO Agreement art. 11(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1144 (stating that TRIPs is a
central component of the WTO Agreement and that TRIPs binds all Members):
TRIPs art. 27-34 (outlining the essential components of WTO Member countries'
patent laws).
21. See TRIPs art. 30, 33 (outlining that "[m]embers may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent").
22. See WTO, DOHA PRESS PACK, NEGOTIATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION AND
TRIPS COUNCIL WORK 24 (2001) [hereinafter DOHA PRESS PACK] (on file with
author) (stating that the Doha Conference intended to clarify ambiguities relating
to Members' use of the flexibilities codified in TRIPs).
23. See id. (stating that "[a]mong the flexibilities most often discussed is
compulsory licensing").
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provisions of TRIPs. 24 The ministerial text intended to discuss two
major issues: the scope of the term "public health" and the ability of
Members without adequate manufacturing capacities to seek the
benefits of compulsory licensing ("third party compulsory
license").25 The result of the meeting in Doha was a Declaration on
the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health ("Declaration"). 26
Accordingly, this Comment interprets the language of the
Declaration and ascertains the meaning of the term "public health" in
light of the Declaration. In the process, this Comment analyzes the
weight that would be afforded to the Declaration by a WTO
adjudicating body.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on drug
development, compulsory licensing and the development of TRIPs.
In addition, Part I details the events leading up to the Doha
Conference. Part II examines the status of compulsory licensing pre-
and post-Doha. The post-Doha status is determined by interpreting
the term "public health" under TRIPs. Additionally, Part II examines
third party licensing by interpreting the term "third party" under
TRIPs. Part II also analyzes how the principle of territoriality affects
the interpretation of the term "third party" under TRIPs. Finally, Part
III recommends that WTO trade ministers further clarify the public
health exception and third party production for export licenses
through official interpretations, declarations and/or amendments.
24. See id. (stating that the ministerial statement intended to "clarify what
governments can do under the TRIPs Agreement, and to reduce their uncertainties
about using the flexibilities that are built into the agreement").
25. See id. at 24-25 (discussing the issues the ministerial declaration seeks to
address). One issue was the scope of the proposed declaration. I. at 24. The
statement indicated that some Members would like the declaration to emphasize
public health as a whole, while others would like the focus to be life-threatening
epidemics. Id. The press statement also indicated that another issue under
consideration is "how countries with limited manufacturing capabilities can take
advantage of compulsory licensing." Id. at 25.
26. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement
and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)IDEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Declaration]
(on file with author) (recognizing the importance of rights protected under TRIPs
as well as the need for developing nations to protect public health), available at
http://www.wto.orglenglishlthewto_e/ministe/min0 l_e/mindecltrips-e.htm (last
visited July 11, 2002).
2002] 1305
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I. BACKGROUND
A. DRUG DEVELOPMENT
Patent laws, like other branches of intellectual property law, are
designed to encourage innovation by providing incentives to
inventors.27 Among these incentives, patent protection allows an
inventor to recoup costs associated with the creation of a product."
In the case of pharmaceuticals, these costs include research, testing,
clinical trials, and obtaining governmental regulatory approval.2'"
Costs average in the hundreds of millions of dollars.3 0 Yet, even after
expending an exorbitant amount of money, a drug may ultimately
prove unmarketable for various reasons."' In reality, revenues of even
the largest of pharmaceutical companies precariously rely on only a
27. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
INTRO TO INTELL. PROP. RTS. (on file with author) ("Strong patent protection for
pharmaceuticals drives medical progress by providing economic incentives for
innovation. Without international respect for pharmaceutical patents, medical
innovation would suffer."), at
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/progress.htm (last visited Jan. 17,
2002). The author supports this assertion by referring to a 1988 study of twelve
industries, in which Dr. Edwin Mansfield of the University of Pennsylvania
concluded that "65 percent of pharmaceutical products would not have been
introduced without adequate patent protection." Id. See also John M. Wechkin,
Comment, Drug Price Regulation and Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical
Patents: The New Zealand Connection, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 237, 238-239
(1995) (stating that patents are designed to foster human creativity and innovation).
28. See Wechkin, supra note 27, at 239 (indicating that patent holders rely on
exclusive rights inherent in a patent to recoup their substantial investment).
29. See id. at 241-42 (discussing the various expenses resulting in the high cost
of drug development).
30. See Mossinghoff, supra note 27 (speculating that pharmaceutical industry
is unique in that actual process of discovering and developing drug is profoundly
expensive, whereas cost of copying or reverse-engineering is minimal).
Pharmaceutical companies spend, on average, S500 million to develop one new
medicine. Id.; Wechkin, supra note 27, at 241-42 (explaining that patents prevent
"free riders" from benefiting without bearing the cost of prior research).
31. See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: /In
Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 303
(1994) (stating that on average, only one out of 4,000 compounds that are
discovered become marketable products).
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few drugs.32  Therefore, pharmaceutical companies seek the
protection of patent laws as a means of ensuring their investments?3
Pharmaceutical companies have the dual goals of earning a profit
and developing new drug entities that improve health and save
lives.34 While many critics point to the dangerous intersection of
profits and improving health and saving lives, the evidence
overwhelmingly indicates it is a successful marriage of goals."
B. COMPULSORY LICENSING GENERALLY
One benefit available to a patent holder is the ability to voluntarily
issue a license for some or all of the rights of a product to another
party.36 In contrast, a compulsory license is a license for a patented
product issued by the government to a third party without the patent
holder's permission.37 In return, the government grants the patent
holder what it believes to be reasonable compensation. 8
The justifications for issuing compulsory licenses include reducing
an issuing country's dependence on imports, increasing the number
of competitors in the marketplace, and protecting and developing
32. See id. at 303-04 (emphasizing a pharmaceutical company's reliance on a
limited number of products for the financial well being of the company).
33. See Michael Montagne, Drug Advertising & Promotion: An Introduction
22 J. DRUG ISSUES 195, 202 (1992) (discussing the role of health care as a
business).
34. See Wechkin, supra note 27, at 239 (stating that patent protection is
designed to protect the inventor's investment in research and development).
35. See Kenneth I. Kaitin, The Role of the Research-Based Pharmaceutical
Industy in Medical Progress in the United States, 33 J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 412, 413-14 (1993) (highlighting that of the 196 new
pharmaceuticals approved by the FDA from 1981 through 1990, the
pharmaceutical industry created 92.4 percent while academia and government
combined to produce 4.6 percent).
36. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 1229-32 (discussing the role of
licenses within patent law).
37. See Seven Developing Nations Urge TRIPs Review to Ensure Compulsory
Licensing for Drugs, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 23, at D7 (June 9, 1999)
(discussing the differing interpretations of compulsory licensing within the
framework of TRIPs).
38. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, § 19.2 (stating that the patent owner is
compelled to license at a rate thought to be reasonable by the government).
2002] 1307
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local industry.3 9 However, the reason that resonates with the highest
moral tone, and is most often cited by developing countries and
activists, is that compulsory licenses result in increased access to
critical lifesaving medicines.40
While compulsory licensing provisions exist in U.S. patent laws,
these exceptions are rare and only available in narrow and very fact-
specific situations.' Developing countries have recently begun to
enact legislation with provisions that allow for practices such as
compulsory licensing and parallel importing of pharmaceuticals."2
The pharmaceutical industry opposes such legislation because the
industry views legislation in developing countries as supportive of
patent infringement practices as the norm rather than the exception."
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPs)
The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property ("Paris Convention"),44 one of the first international
39. See Wechkin, supra note 27, at 240 (discussing the various reasons ii
support of compulsory licensing).
40. See Ford, supra note 16, at 945-46 (noting the increased attention placed on
compulsory licensing by the controversy over right to drug access for lie-
threatening diseases).
41. See Fisch, supra note 31, at 301 (observing that compulsory licensing
provisions in U.S. patent law are rare and are used to redress antitrust violations, to
prevent restrictions on use of air pollution control, and to encourage atomic energy
inventions); see also Dolmo, supra note 9, at 153-54 (describing the ability of' the
National Institutes of Health ("NIH") to retain title to patents and to license
inventions that result from NIH funding under the Federal Technology and
Transfer Act of 1986).
42. See Consuner Project on Technology, U.S. Dep 't of State Report: U.S.
Gov't Efforts to Negotiate the Repeal, Termination, or Withdrawal of Article 15(c)
of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1965, U.S. DEi' oi0
STATE, Feb. 5, 1999 [hereinafter State Dep t Report on South African Medicines
Act] (noting the effect of the new amendment, Article 15(c), on pharmaceutical
patent rights), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/stdept-feb5 1999.html (last
visited Aug. 4, 2002).
43. See Ford, supra note 16, at 966 (noting that legislation enacted with broad
provisions on compulsory licensing would lead to a massive wave of licenses
granted for essentially minor health risks and would have a resultant adverse
impact on pharmaceutical industry profits).
44. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1308 [17:1299
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agreements on intellectual property, allowed for disparate standards
of patent protection among different countries. -5 Subsequent
revisions of the Paris Convention led to the creation of the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") in 1967.6
The creation of WIPO signaled recognition of the importance of
developing common international standards for intellectual property
law.47 However, WIPO fails to constitute anything more than a forum
for discussion. 8 While this forum was and continues to be important,
manufacturers of patented products lacked sufficient patent
protection in foreign countries, had no protection in some instances, 9
and lacked a means of redress.5 0
As research and development costs rose in the twentieth century,5
trade liberalization resulted in intense competition in the open market
1883, art. 4(C)(1), 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 315 (stating international intellectual
property standards prior to the enactment of TRIPs).
45. See Carolyn S. Corn, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents in Brazil: Is
Compulsoty Licensing the Solution?, 9 B.U. INrt'L L.J. 71, 71-75 (1991) (detailing
the obligation of Paris Convention signatories to ensure that foreign patent holders
have the same protection granted to citizens of the signatory country). The author
also notes the Convention's failure to set a commonly applicable framework for
intellectual property laws. Id. See also John A. Harrelson. TRIPs. Pharmaceutical
Patents, and the HIVIAIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
Itellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 175, 178-80
(2001) (citing the Paris Convention's failure to harmonize patent laws among its
member nations and questioning the usefulness of international patent protection
that is inherently varied and domestically determined).
46. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization,
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. 6932 (establishing an international
organization dealing with intellectual property laws and issues).
47. See generally Corn, supra note 45, at 73 (stating the goals of WIPO as
maximizing participation of developing countries in an international patent system
and promoting intellectual property protection).
48. See id. at 74 (noting that WIPO's role is primarily one of guidance and
persuasion because it has failed to delineate meaningful basic standards for
intellectual property law and lacks enforcement power).
49. See id. at 74-5 (explaining that patented products in the international
market regularly lose patent protection provided by the original granting nation).
Corn notes Brazil's failure, as of 1991 and prior to WTO, to provide any patent
protection with regard to pharmaceuticals. Id.
50. See id. at 75 (noting the lack of remedies available to a manufacturer whose
patent rights have failed to be adequately protected by a foreign nation).
51. See CORREA, TRIPS POLICY, supra note 19, at 3-4 (discussing the various
2002] 1-309
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among manufacturers and developers. 52 Thus, intellectual property
became a critical trade issue, and the international community
simultaneously created the WTO53 and drafted TRIPs.5 "
D. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF TRIPs
TRIPs Article 7 lists the objectives of TRIPs as to protect and
enforce intellectual property rights so as to promote technological
innovation, and to share information to the collective benefit of both
producers and users.5 The sharing and promotion of technological
factors that necessitated the creation of TRIPs, such as technological
advancements, globalization, and diminishing technological leadership of U.S.
companies). The author explains that with increased technological sophistication
came "high externalities in the production of knowledge," which consequently
limited the usefulness of traditional research and development ("R&D"). Id. In
other words, as the science-intensive sectors became more precise, research and
development of a new invention required more time and money. M. This factor in
turn caused firms involved in the production of high-tech inventions to demand
enhanced intellectual property protections as a means of recouping their R&D
costs. Id. Together these reasons caused the vigorous push by industrialized
countries to universalize standards of intellectual property protection. d. See also
Mossinghoff, supra note 27 (discussing the dramatic increase in R&D since 1985).
The author's research shows that in 1985, the pharmaceutical industry had an R&D
investment of approximately $4,100 million. Id. That figure increased fourfold in
ten years, rising to almost $16,000 million. Id.
52. See CORREA, TRIPS POLICY, supra note 19, at 4 (explaining the problem
associated with the declining technological capacity of U.S. firms). According to
Correa, the 1980s saw the United States as the world leader in technology and
manufacturing. Id. However, prompted by the "catching-up process" of innovative
Asian countries with fast-emerging industrial bases, this supremacy dramatically
declined in the 1990s. Id. As the Asian markets progressed and transformed into
stronger competitors, U.S. businesses realized significant losses, particularly in the
high-tech sector. Id. "The erosion of the technological leadership of U.S. firms in
certain high-tech areas, coupled with the high U.S. trade deficit, was partially
attributed to a too-open technological and scientific system which allowed foreign
countries to imitate and profit from U.S. innovations." Id. Industrial lobbies
dissatisfied with the patent regime under the Paris Convention started a campaign
seeking enhanced intellectual property protection to prevent copycats and restore
returns on R&D. Id.
53. WTO Agreement, supra note 18, art. I.
54. TRIPs, supira note 17, preamble. See Ford, supra note 16, at 948
(describing the events leading to the creation of the WTO and signing of the
TRIPS agreement).
55. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 7.
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
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innovation should be done in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare while providing an equal balance of rights and
obligations. 6  TRIPs further seeks to provide certainty and
predictability for transactions in the international market" by
encouraging countries to enact patent laws with the same basic
principles.
TRIPs Article 8 sets out the overall guiding principle for
Members. 8 Member countries are authorized to adopt the necessary
measures to protect public health when formulating their own
national intellectual property legislation. 9 Furthermore, member
countries are authorized to take appropriate measures to protect and
promote areas that are vital to socio-economic and technological
development.60
While this language seems to give broad, sweeping powers to
Member Countries, the second part of Section 1, Article 8 provides
the context in which countries should interpret the language of
necessary measures.6 The second part defines appropriate measures
as those that are needed to prevent patent holders from abusing their
rights or resorting to practices that restrain trade or inhibit the
transfer of technology.62
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. art. 8(1) ("Members may, in formulating or amending their national
laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socio-economic and technological development, provided such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.").
59. See id.
60. TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 8(1).
61. See id. art. 8(2) ("Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.").
62. See id.
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E. LEADING UP TO DOHA: BAD PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CIPRO
While it is widely accepted that TRIPs provides for compulsory
licensing,63 the United States, until recently," maintained that
developing countries were violating TRIPs by enacting laws that
allowed for the issuance of such licenses. 65 The cost of critical
HIV/AIDS drugs became a controversial and contentious issue with
the exponential increase in the number of HIV/AIDS cases and
related deaths on the African continent. 6
63. See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to
Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71, 72 (2001)
(stating that the TRIPs Agreement "manifestly permits governments to authorize
... compulsory licenses"). The author notes that, when Article 31 of TRIPs is read
in conjunction with Article 2:1 of TRIPs and Article 5.A.2 of the Paris Convention,
TRIPs clearly provides authority for the issuance of compulsory licenses. ld. at 74.
64. See Testimony on the Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Abroad.
Particularly with Respect to Combating the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic?: Itlearing
Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and human
Resources, Commn. on Gov't Reform, 106th Cong. 152 (1999) [hereinafler
Papovich Testimony] (statement of Joseph Papovich, Assistant U.S. Trade Rep.)
(testifying, in 1999, that the TRIPs Agreement allows for compulsory licensing in
specific situations and that the United States would not object if such provisions
were part of South African law), available at
http://www.house.gov/reform/cj/hearings/99.7.22/Papovich.htm (last visited July
11, 2002): Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States and Brazil
Agree to Use Newly Created Consultative Mechanism to Promote Cooperation on
HIV/AIDS and Address WTO Patent Dispute (June 25, 2001) [hereinafter USTR
2001], (stating that the Bush Administration would continue the policy of not
raising objections to compulsory licensing provisions in developing countries'
laws, if they were aimed at addressing HIV/AIDS), at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/06/0 1-46.htm (last visited July 11, 2002).
65. See State Dep 't Report on South African Medicines Act, supra note 42, at 5
(stating that the United States strongly criticized South Africa's Medicines Act as
being "clearly inconsistent" with South Africa's obligations under TRIPs, and
began taking actions in opposition to the Act prior to its 1997 enactment). This
report, issued in 1999, but recounting actions taken at least as far back as 1997,
also described the USTR's role as engaging South Africa in bilateral negotiations
aimed at achieving the repeal, termination, or withdrawal of the offending
provisions. Id. at 4.
66. See Mary K. Schug, Note, Promoting Access to FlV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals
in Sub-Saharan Africa Within the Framework of International Intellectual
Property Law, 19 LAW & INEQ. 229, 235-36 (2001) (pointing out that most HIV-
infected people in Sub-Saharan Africa go untreated because of the "staggering"
prices of AIDS drugs); Dolmo, supra note 9, at 140 (noting that the annual
HIV/AIDS drug cocktail cost of $12,000 is "prohibitive" for most of the African
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Logically, patents and their part in the prohibitive cost of
medications became a very politically hot issue.67 Supporting strong
patent regimes quickly became equivalent to blocking HIV/AIDS
sufferers' access to critical medications.65 Consequently, when the
pharmaceutical industry filed suit against the South African
government in 2000 over a newly enacted domestic law that allowed
for compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals, 6 the accompanying
media coverage created the perception that the big pharmaceutical
companies and the U.S. government, as their greatest supporter,
favored patents over lives.7" The potentially devastating political
liability sent top U.S. officials scrambling to reverse their position on
the South African law.71 The pharmaceutical industry soon followed
population).
67. See Associated Press, U.S. Defines Policy on AfIDS Drugs jbr South .frica
(July 22, 1999) (briefly noting the various arguments put forth by White House
officials, congressional members, trade representatives, the pharmaceutical
industry, and consumer groups concerning the issue of U.S. trade policy and
pharmaceutical patent protection in South Africa), available at
http://www.actupdc.org/africa/chatinka.htmil (last visited July 11, 2002).
68. See OxFAM, PATENT INJUSTICE: How WORLD TRADE RULES TtIREATEN
THE HEALTH OF POOR PEOPLE 2, 3 (2001) (arguing for changes in international
intellectual property standards because a strict patent regime is a major
contributing factor to the public health crises in developing countries), at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/cutthecost/downloads/patent.pdf (last visited Aug. 4
2002); MtDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, supra note 2 (arguing that if patent laws were
relaxed then the suffering of millions of people afflicted by infectious diseases
worldwide would be lessened).
69. See Sarah Bosely, At the Mercy of Drug Giants: Millions Struggle with
Disease as Pharmaceutical Firms Go to Court to Protect Profits, GUARDIAN, Feb.
12, 2001 (reporting that approximately forty pharmaceutical companies are
engaged in an ongoing legal challenge to article 15(c) of South Africa's 1997
Medicines Act in a South African court), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4134799,00.html (last visited
Aug. 4,2002).
70. See id. (portraying the U.S. government and the pharmaceutical industry as
taking legal actions to protect pharmaceutical patents at the expense of lives).
71. Compare Julian Borger, Gore Accused of W1orking Against Cheap AIDS
Drugs, DAILY MAIL & GUARDIAN, Aug. 10, 1999 (reporting on Vice President Al
Gore's efforts to lobby South Africa's government to ensure strong pharmaceutical
patent protection), available at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99aug l/10aug-
aids.html (last visited July 11, 2002), with Ed Vulliamy & David Beresford South
Afiica Beats U.S. Over Cost of AIDS Drugs, DAILY MAIL & GUARDIAN, Sept. 2 1,
1999 (reporting that Vice President Gore intended to abandon "'his attempts to
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and dropped the suit in the spring of 200 1.72
The misstep in the South African case changed the U.S.' general
approach to dealing with similar compulsory licensing legislation in
other developing countries.73 Most notably, the United States
dropped a complaint filed with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
against Brazil regarding its Intellectual Property Law,7 4 choosing
instead to pursue private bilateral negotiations.7 1 Still, many
developing countries were hesitant to enact such laws as steps to
address HIV/AIDS in their respective countries.76
Then in the fall of 2001, the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") Tommy Thompson effectively destroyed any
credibility left in the U.S. argument that compulsory licensing for
pharmaceuticals was an undesirable option to address public health
intimidate" South Africa's President Mbeki into changing South Africa's
Medicines Act due to the effects of negative public relations on his presidential
campaign), available at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99sep2/2 I sep-
aids.drugs.html (last visited July 11, 2002).
72. See Karen DeYoung, Makers of AIDS Drugs Drop S. Africa Suit, WASI I.
POST, Apr. 19, 2001, at A13 (reporting that the world's major pharmaceutical
companies planned to drop their suit against the South African government due to
the "public relations nightmare"), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dynA34439-
2001 Aprl 18?language=printer (last visited July 11, 2002).
73. Compare USTR 2001, supra note 64 (stating that the Bush Administration
will not object if WTO Member countries avail themselves of the flexibilitics
offered by TRIPs in order to address major health crises, such as HIV/AIDS), with
State Dep 't Report on South African Medicines Act, supra note 42, at 4 (detailing
the U.S.' efforts, including those of the USTR and former Vice President Gore, to
have the South African government repeal, withdraw, or terminate provisions of
the Medicines Act).
74. See USTR 2001, supra note 64 (reporting that the United States and Brazil
mutually agreed to transfer a disagreement over Brazil's patent law from the WTO
formal litigation to a bilateral consultative forum).
75. See id. (noting that transferring the dispute from the WTO is intended to
achieve a "more effective and less confrontational consideration of intellectual
property issues").
76. See Gustavo Capdevila, Trade: Developing World Demands Clear Rules on
Access to Drugs, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Geneva), June 20, 2001 (reporting the
comments of European Union representative Carlo Trojan who stated that
developing countries hesitate to use compulsory licensing provisions because they
fear WTO litigation and sanctions), available at 2001 WL 480434 1.
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crises.77 In the midst of an anthrax scare following the terrorist
attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, the HHS
Secretary threatened the Bayer AG Corporation that the U.S.
government would issue a compulsory license for Bayer's
blockbuster antibiotic Cipro (ciprofloxacin), unless Bayer lowered its
selling price for Cipro to the U.S. government."8
The reaction to Tommy Thompson's action was swift and
critical.79 Many countries simply recognized the inherent hypocrisy
of the Secretary's position. 0 If the United States could assert the
right to issue a compulsory license for a public health scare that
resulted in less than a dozen deaths, then how could it maintain that
developing countries should not take similar measures to address the
HIV/AIDS crisis in their respective countries?8'
In November 2001, the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference took
place in Doha, Quatar.8 2 With the South African case and the Cipro
77. See generally U.S. Threat to Cipro Patent Criticized, INTELL. PROP.
STRATEGIST, Nov. 2001, at 7 [hereinafter Cipro Threat Criticized] (indicating that
Tommy Thompson's threat to override Bayer's Cipro patent places the United
States in a difficult position to defend the request that developing countries should
resist overriding patents).
78. See id. (describing Tommy Thompson's threat to override Bayer's patent
on Cipro, in the wake of the anthrax scare, as a means to obtain lower prices for
the drug).
79. See, e.g., Emma Young, US Accused of Double Standards on Dng Patents,
NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 2, 2001 (reporting that French Trade Secretary Francois
Huwart believed that the U.S.' actions with regards to Cipro gave developing
countries the legitimate impression that "double standards are in place"), at
http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99991512 (last visited July 11,
2002).
80. See id. (implying that countries view the threat to override the Cipro patent
as a double standard); Cipro Threat Criticized, supra note 77, at 7 (reporting that
the threat to the Cipro patent has been viewed as a hypocritical action on the part
of the U.S. government).
81. See Cipro Threat Criticized, supra note 77, at 7 (noting that the threat to
Bayer's patent was characterized as hypocritical primarily because the United
States purported to justify overriding a patent for a "scare," whereas the United
States previously opposed similar actions by countries attempting to deal with
AIDS crises).
82. See Young, supra note 79 (stating that developing countries' access to
patented medicines will be a key issue at the fourth ministerial conference in Doha
on November 9, 2001); Frances Williams, Declaration on Patent Rules Cheers
Developing Nations, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at 6 (on file with author)
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incident occurring in the same year,8" the United States was in a
difficult position to object to the demands of developing countries. 4
Although the draft ministerial declaration submitted by the
developed countries lacked any overt reference to compulsory
licenses,85 the final official declaration set relatively broad conditions
under which a country could grant a compulsory license for
pharmaceuticals.8 6
II. ANALYSIS:THE LEGAL STATUS OF
COMPULSORY LICENSING
A. PRINCIPLES FOR INTERPRETING TRIPS
A WTO Appellate Body87 ("AB") and more recently a WTO
Panel88 ("Panel") interpreted TRIPs in accordance with the principles
(announcing the signing of the Declaration on Patent rules at the Doha
Ministerial).
83. See DeYoung, supra note 72, at A13 (reporting on April 19, 2001
withdrawal of the pharmaceutical industries' lawsuit against the South African
government); Cipro Threat Criticized, supra note 77, at 7 (reporting in November
2001 the Secretary of HHS's threat to issue a compulsory license for Cipro).
84. See Young, supra note 79 (suggesting that the world community would
consider the United States hypocritical if it opposed relaxing restrictions on TRIPs
standards for compulsory licenses in the wake of the Cipro incident).
85. See Draft Ministerial Declaration, Proposal From a Group oJ Developed
Countries, IP/C/W/313 (Oct. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Developed Countries Drqt]
(lacking the term "compulsory license" within the text of the draft). The draft was
proposed and submitted to the TRIPs Council by Australia, Canada, Japan,
Switzerland, and the United States. Id.
86. See Declaration, supra note 26, para. 4-5 (stating that WTO Members have
the right "to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPs Agreement, which provide
flexibility for this purpose"). The purpose is to safeguard the Members' right to
"protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all."
Id.
87. See WTO Appellate Body Report. India-Patent Protection fir
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 45
(Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter India-Mailbox AB] (stating that TRIPs should be
interpreted in accordance with the principles outlined in Article 3 1 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last
visited July 11, 2002).
88. See WTO Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, WT/DS 114/R, para. 7.13 (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Generic]
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of interpretation contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"). 9 VCLT Article 3 1(1) states that the
words of a treaty must be given their ordinary meaning in their
context and read in light of the treaty's object and purpose."° When
determining the object and purpose of a treaty, the Panel
interpretation should be tied closely to the actual textY Selected
material other than the text must also be considered for the purpose
of providing context.92 However, supplementary material should only
be used to confirm the meaning derived from an Article 31 analysis
(stating that "rules that govern the interpretation of WTO agreements are the rules
of treaty interpretation stated in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention"),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited July 11, 2002).
89. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. May 23, 1969, art. 31(1),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, [hereinafter VCLT] ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose"), available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm (last visited July 11, 2002).
90. See id. (defining treaty interpretation principles); India-Mailbox AB, supra
note 87, para. 45 (stating that a treaty interpreter should examine the words of a
treaty in accordance with the "ordinary meaning analysis" set out in Article 31 of
Vienna Convention); Canada-Generic, supra note 88, para. 7.13 (stating that the
starting point of an ordinary meaning analysis is VCLT Article 31 (1)).
91. See India-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 56 (indicating that the
surrounding subparagraphs (b) and (c) constitute context for discerning the
meaning of the word "means" as used in subparagraph (a) of Article 70.8 of
TRIPs). The appellate body also reviewed other articles such as TRIPs Articles 65
and 1.1 for guidance. Id. paras. 58, 59.
92. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 31(2), (3) (specifying the additional material
outside of the treaty text that must be considered when conducting an ordinary
meaning analysis). VCLT Article 31(2) states that under VCLT Article 31(1) the
context "shall" include:
[I]n addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
Id. art. 31(2). In addition to the context, as defined in VCLT Article 31(2), VCLT
Article 31(3) states that the following "shall" be taken into account:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
Id. art. 31(3).
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or to clarify an analysis that results in an ambiguous meaning or
"leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."'93
A central issue in India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products ("India-Mailbox") was whether the
Panel properly interpreted the word "means" in TRIPs Article
70.8(a).94 Specifically, India appealed the Panel's finding that the
good faith interpretation requirement of VCLT Article 3 19 mandated
that the "legitimate expectations" of the parties to TRIPs be
considered when interpreting the term "means." 96 The AB disagreed
with the Panel and held that treaty interpreters should refer to the
actual language of the treaty. 97 Furthermore, the AB held that the
"legitimate expectations" of the parties are already reflected in the
actual text of the TRIPs, and therefore, outside words and concepts
93. See Canada-Generic, supra note 88, para. 7.13 (referring to VCLT Article
32 in discussing when a treaty interpreter should refer to supplementary material).
The WTO Panel recognized that negotiating history is a type of supplementary
material. Id. See also India-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 48 (implying that in
the appropriate circumstances negotiating history may be considered while
interpreting TRIPs).
94. See India-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 28(a) (describing the issue as
the proper interpretation of the Article 70.8(a) requirement that a Member must
provide "a means" by which applications for patents for inventions can be filed).
This case was brought on an appeal by the Indian government seeking to overturn the
lower Panel's decision. Id. para. 3. India argued that the lower panel's interpretation
of the term "means" in TRIPs Article 70.8(a) was erroneous. Id. para. 28(a). The
United States asserted that India's administrative practices failed to meet the
requirements of TRIPs Article 70.8(a). Id, para. I. See also TRIPs art. 70(8)(a)
(requiring those Members granted a delay in enacting patent protection to establish a
"means by which applications for such inventions can be filed").
95. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 3 1(1) (requiring that a treaty be interpreted
in "good faith").
96. See India-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 33 (stating India's objection to
the importation of a Members' "legitimate expectations" concerning TRIPs into
the "good faith interpretation" principle). See also WTO Panel Report, India-
Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS50/R, para. 7.22 (Sep. 5, 1997) [hereinafter India-Mailbox Panel]
(concluding that "when interpreting the text of the TRIPs Agreement, the legitimate
expectations of WTO Members concerning the TRIPs Agreement must be taken into
account"), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited July 1I, 2002).
97. See India-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 45 (stating that a treaty
interpreter's duty is "to examine the words of a treaty to determine the intentions
of the parties").
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should not be introduced into TRIPs. 8
Although the AB holding seemingly contradicts the clear language
of VCLT Article 31(2) and 31(3)," this is misleading because the
AB's comments in India-Mailbox were specifically directed at
supplementary material.10 If confronted with material that is not a
treaty and not supplementary, such as subsequent WTO agreements,
the AB will likely follow VCLT Article 31 in its entirety and
incorporate those documents into an interpretation of TRIPs. '0'
B. COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER THE TEXT OF TRIPS
At the time of its passage, TRIPs differed from other previously
negotiated agreements because it set minimum international
standards that were uniformly binding on all Members.' TRIPs
Article 31 incorporates language that allows for practices such as
compulsory licensing. 03 TRIPs Article 31(b) outlines the pre-
98. See id. (emphasizing that the principles of interpretation outlined in the
VCLT do not require nor do they "condone the imputation into a treaty of words
that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended").
99. See supra note 92 (quoting language from VCLT Article 31(2), (3) that
mandates the consideration of material outside of the treaty text in order to
determine a meaning under Article 3 1(1)).
100. See India-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 33 (quoting the lower Panel
decision that the term "legitimate expectations" as used in the AB report refers to
the expectations of the parties negotiating TRIPs). Negotiating history falls within
supplementary material. Id. at 48. See also VCLT, supra note 89, art. 32 (stating
that supplementary material includes "preparatory work of the treaty").
101. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 31(2), (3) (mandating that while performing
a proper VCLT ordinary meaning analysis, certain additional agreements should be
considered in order to provide context).
102. Compare Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third
World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework,
22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 702-04 (1989) (discussing international
intellectual property standards, prior to TRIPs, under the Paris and Berne
Conventions), with CORREA, TRIPs POLICY, supra note 19, at 1-3 (offering a
general overview of TRIPs and concluding that TRIPs provides a broader coverage
of intellectual property rights than agreements prior to its enactment). The author
also notes that TRIPs provides much stronger enforcement provisions. Id.
103. See TRIPS, supra note 17, art. 31 (stating Member nations may enact laws
that allow "for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization
of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by
the government" under specified conditions); see also Ford, supra note 16, at 960-
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conditions to a Member's issuance of a compulsory license."", Under
normal conditions, the licensee, whether a Member or third party
entity, must engage the patent holder in negotiations before obtaining
a compulsory license. 05 This requirement may be waived in the
event of a national emergency or another extremely urgent
situation. 106
Significantly, TRIPS neglects to define the term "national
emergency" anywhere within the text. 07 Such ambiguity in the
language of TRIPs led to different interpretations of the speciic
exceptions and the conditions under which Members may pursue
those exceptions.'08
C. UNDERSTANDING THE DOHA DECLARATION
At the time of the fourth ministerial conference, the WTO
intended for the Doha Declaration to clarify certain ambiguous terms
and phrases in TRIPs, 109 such as "national emergency.""" To this
end, both developing countries and developed countries submitted
draft Declarations."' The final language more closely resembles the
61 (discussing the ambiguity of Article 31 of TRIPS and the resultant
interpretation that authorizes compulsory licensing).
104. See TRIPs art. 31(b) (outlining the actions a Member must take prior to
authorizing another use under Article 31).
105. See id. (explaining that the party authorized for the "other use" must
conduct negotiations on "reasonable commercial terms and conditions").
Furthermore, the party must allow a "reasonable period of time" to achieve a
mutual agreement. Id.
106. See id. (stating that the licensee may waive negotiations "in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency"). Even in the case
of a waiver, the licensee should notify the patent holder of the authorization as
promptly as possible. Id.
107. See id arts. 1-73 (lacking a definition of the term "national emergency").
108. See Ford, supra note 16, at 963-67 (discussing the widely differing
interpretations of Article 31 language by developing and developed countries).
109. See DOHA PRESS PACK, supra note 22, at 24 (stating that the objective of
the ministerial declaration on TRIPs is to "clarify what governments can do under
the TRIPs Agreement, and to reduce their uncertainties about using the flexibilitics
that are built into the agreement").
110. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (providing examples of
ambiguity within TRIPs).
I 11. See generally Developed Countries Draft, supra note 85 (offering a drafl
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desires of the developing countries, 2' - and represents a significant
shift in position for developed countries, such as the United States." 3
The Doha Declaration contains its major conclusions in
paragraphs 1 through 5.111 Paragraphs I through 3 attempt to provide
context to the issue of intellectual property protection for medicines
and to recognize the need to balance private property and public
welfare interests." 5 The first part of paragraph 4 outlines the
permissible scope of Members' rights with regard to actions taken to
protect public health.' 1 6 The second part of paragraph 4 emphasizes
that Members should interpret TRIPs in a manner to protect public
health.117 Paragraph 5 contains the most controversial provisions,
those that provide Members with flexibilities in implementing
declaration containing terminology and phrasing desired by countries representing
the developed countries); Draft Ministerial Declaration, Proposal From a Group
of Developing Countries, IP/C/W/312, WTIGCIW/450 (Oct. 4, 2001) [hereinafter
Developing Countries Draft] (proposing a version of a declaration that contained
the expectations and language of countries representing developing countries). The
African Group, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela submitted this draft
declaration. Id.
112. See Williams, supra note 82, at 6 (reporting the final Declaration as a
"victory for developing countries").
113. Compare Declaration, supra note 26, para. 4 (asserting that using
permissive and broad language such as TRIPs "does not and should not prevent"
Members from enacting measures to protect public health), with Developel
Countries Draft, supra note 85 (stating only that TRIPs "'contributes to the
availability of medicines"). The Developed Countries Draft consistently uses the
term "pandemic" rather than a term as encompassing as "public health." Id.
114. See Declaration, supra note 26, paras. 1-5 (acknowledging the importance
of TRIPs to public health, and its flexibilities).
115. See id., paras. 1-3 (emphasizing that both private and public interests are
important considerations). The Declaration begins by recognizing that developing
and least-developed countries are facing disastrous public health problems. Id.
para. 1. Paragraph 2 stresses that TRIPs should be "part of the wider national and
international action." Id. para. 2. Finally, paragraph 3 highlights the importance of
intellectual property protection for the development of new medicines, but
acknowledges concerns surrounding the higher prices. d. para. 3.
116. See id. para. 4 (stating that "[w]e agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not
and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health").
117. See id. (stating that "the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all").
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TRIPs)' 8 Paragraph 6 leaves the issue of compulsory licenses and
Members who lack adequate pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacities unresolved.'19
The opening three paragraphs of the Declaration describe the chief
concerns of developing and developed countries, and form the
framework for understanding the rest of the Declaration.1 20 As stated
in paragraph 1 and the second sentence of paragraph 3, developing
countries are primarily concerned about the overwhelming public
health epidemics in their countries and the high cost of the
medications needed to treat afflicted populations.121 On the other
hand, developed countries want to emphasize the demonstrated value
of patent protection and perhaps, more importantly, that diseases like
HIV/AIDS necessitate a wider and more comprehensive effort. 22
Paragraph 4 is a strong affirmative statement emphasizing that
protecting public health, particularly promoting access to medicines,
is a valid basis for Members to enact and exercise exceptions to
118. See Declaration, supra note 26, para. 5 (outlining the flexibilities contained
in TRIPs, such as the power to grant compulsory licenses and the determination of
a national emergency).
119. See id. para. 6 (instructing the TRIPs Council to research a solution or
those countries with inadequate pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities).
120. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
paragraphs 1-3 of the Declaration).
121. See Declaration, supra note 26, paras. 1, 3 (noting the "gravity" of health
problems in developing and least-developed Member countries, which help
develop an understanding of the concern surrounding high drug prices).
122. See id. para. 2 (reminding Members of the role of intellectual property
protections in the development of new medicines and that relaxing protections is
only part of the solution to public health epidemics); see also Developed Countries
Draft, supra note 85 (stating that an effective response to the challenges presented
by pandemics consists of a "mix of complementary social, economic, health
policies and practices, including education and prevention programmes"). The
draft declaration goes on to state:
[a]mong the determinant factors for improving access to medicines are
efficient infrastructure to distribute, deliver and monitor drug usage and
provide necessary information and education; increased research and
development particularly targeted at the major communicable diseases of
relevance for developing countries; mechanisms to finance drug purchases,
and affordable pharmaceuticals; and the implementation of effective and
sustainable healthcare systems.
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patent protection in their domestic legislation12 3 TRIPs Article 8,
outlining the principles of the TRIPs, permits Members to "adopt
measures necessary to protect public health."' 2 TRIPs Articles 30
and 31 relate to flexibilities, 15 and fail to provide any reference to
TRIPs Article 8 or the acceptable bases upon which Members may
exercise the provisions.1 26 Applying the VCLT Article 31 principles
of treaty interpretation,2 7 the text of TRIPs Articles 30 and 3 1, read
in light of article 8, may already permit countries to exercise TRIPs
flexibilities to protect public health. -128
Paragraph 4 obviates this analysis by specifically stating that
Members have the right to use TRIPs flexibilities in order to protect
the public health.' 29 Developing countries exercising these provisions
to address public health concerns can now depend on a clear
interpretative statement, should future challenges be brought before
123. See Declaration, supra note 26, para. 4 (indicating that Members may use
all the provisions in TRIPs that provide for flexibility when attempting to protect
public health, particularly to promote access to medicines); see also TRIPs, supra
note 17, arts. 30-31 (failing to provide bases upon which a Member may exercise
TRIPs' flexibilities).
124. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 8 (outlining the guiding principles of TRIPs).
The first principle indicates that Members should have some flexibility in shaping
their domestic patent laws in order to address public health problems. Id.
125. See id. art. 30-31 (containing the exceptions to the exclusive rights of
patent holders). Article 30 is titled "Exceptions to Rights Conferred." I. art. 30.
Article 31 is titled "Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder." i. art.
31.
126. See TRIPs, supra note 17, arts. 30-31 (noting that TRIPs fails to provide
bases upon which Members can obtain compulsory licenses). TRIPs Articles 30
and 31 do not make any reference to the principles outlined in TRIPs Article 8. Id.
The "national emergency" and "extreme urgency" clause of TRIPs Article 31(b) is
simply a basis for waiving licensing negotiations with the patent holder. Id. art.
31(b).
127. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 3 1(1) (examining a treaty and its terms in
light of its object and purpose).
128. See TRIPs, supra note 17, arts. 30-31 (acknowledging that Members may
enact measures that violate a patent holder's exclusive rights); id. art. 8 (stating as
a guiding principle that Members may enact measures to address public health
concerns).
129. See Declaration, supra note 26, para. 4 (affirming that Members may fully
use the flexibilities in TRIPs for the "purpose" of protecting public health and
promoting access to medicines).
2002] 1323
AM. U. INT' L. REV.
the WTO. 13
The Declaration, however, goes beyond a broad reference to
TRIPs flexibilities 3' Paragraph 5 explicitly states that Members may
issue compulsory licenses. 32 Where the Declaration is concerned,
Members should limit grounds for the issuance of such licenses to
the protection of public health and promoting access to medicines"'
"in the light of paragraph 4."134
Paragraph 5 also clarifies the term "national emergency" in TRIPs
Article 31.135 Under TRIPs, the most expeditious avenue for a
country to issue a compulsory license is to claim a national
emergency. 36 Both developing and developed countries sought to
define the term "national emergency" because the text of TRIPs
failed to provide interpretive guidance.' 37 The Declaration provides
Members the "right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency,"' 31 and expressly indicates that "public health crises,""''
130. See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text (analyzing the weight a
Panel would accord the Declaration if a Member relied on it).
131. See Declaration, supra note 26, para. 5 (discussing compulsory licensing).
132. See id. para. 5(b) (stating that "[e]ach Member has the right to grant
compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such
licenses are granted").
133. See Declaration, supra note 26 at para. 4 (allowing Members to protect
"public health" and "promote access to medicines").
134. See id. para. 5 (prefacing the entire paragraph with an introductory clause
stating "in the light of paragraph 4 above").
135. See id. para. 5(c) ("Each Member has the right to determine what
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it
being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency.").
136. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text (discussing the
preconditions to the issuance of a compulsory licensing outlined in TRIPs Article
31 (b)).
137. See TRIPs, supra note 17, arts. 1-73 (failing to define the term "national
emergency").
138. See Declaration, supra note 26, para. 5(c) (clarifying the circumstances
that constitute a national emergency).
139. See id. (specifying that "public health crises" would represent national
emergencies).
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such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and "other epidemics," ''4  will be
considered as national emergencies."
Paragraph 5(a) also reminds Members that they should read "each
provision of the TRIPs Agreement"'1 in light "of the Agreement as
expressed... in its objectives and principles ' "'3 using the language
of Article 31 of the VCLT.' This mode of analysis applies to the
flexibilities within the TRIPs Agreement. 45
Finally, while the Declaration notifies Members about how a
WTO dispute settlement body may interpret the previously
ambiguous terms and issues,146 the Declaration does not restrict
Members' rights to use the dispute settlement procedure, with the
exception of paragraph 5(d))47 Consequently, Developed Member
governments may still bring complaints before the Dispute
Settlement Body regarding the very terms and issues addressed in the
Declaration. 48
140. See id. (offering HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria as representative
examples of the epidemics included within the term "public health crises").
141. See id. para. 5(c) (illustrating examples of national emergencies).
142. See id. para. 5(a) (providing guidance for interpreting international law and
the TRIPs agreement).
143. See id. (highlighting that Members "'shall" consider the principles and
objectives of the Agreement in any interpretation of the TRIPs provisions).
144. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 31 (outlining the general rule of
interpretation).
145. See Declaration, supra note 26, para. 5 (prefacing statements on TRIPs
flexibilities with subsection in 5(a) emphasizing public international law
principles).
146. See generally id. paras. 1-5 (containing negotiated interpretations of terms
and issues surrounding public health and TRIPs).
147. See id. para. 5(d) (barring Members from challenging other Members'
schemes dealing with the exhaustion of intellectual property rights).
148. See DOHA PRESS PACK, supra note 22, at 24-25 (stating that Members
would protect their rights to dispute settlement procedures and would protest any
significant restraint on the rights during negotiations).
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D. WTO MEMBERS MAY ISSUE COMPULSORY LICENSES TO
ADDRESS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED EPIDEMICS
The focus of the Declaration on addressing epidemics is narrower
than the broad public health focus originally sought by developing
countries.4 9 Much of the public attention surrounding compulsory
licensing and other TRIPs flexibilities concerning pharmaceuticals
has concentrated on HIV/AIDS. 50 Developing countries sought a
broader mandate to exercise TRIPs flexibilities for public health
concerns as a whole. 5 ' The drafters intended the Declaration to
clarify, remove uncertainties, and provide guidance in this area. 2
Unfortunately, the text fails to achieve this goal because of internal
inconsistencies. 153
Take for example country A, a poor, developing nation
experiencing public health event B, the effective and expeditious
resolution of which necessitates patented drug C. In addition, assume
that the population of country A cannot afford drug C. Country A
decides to issue a compulsory license for drug C. The patent holder's
country could challenge country A's decision by asserting that public
health event B is not the type of TRIPs public health event that
allows for the issuance of a compulsory license. 5 4 In such a
149. See Developing Countries Draft, supra note I1l (suggesting a broad Focus
to include virtually every illness classified as a "disease"). The draft declaration
asserts that Members have an "obligation to protect and promote the fundamental
human rights to life and the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health, including the prevention, treatment, and control of
epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases." Id.
150. See generally Schug, supra note 66, at 230 (focusing on I-IIV/AIDS when
discussing issues surrounding TRIPs and public health); Ford, supra note 16, at
950 (using the South African HIV/AIDS crisis as a platform to discuss compulsory
licensing issues).
151. See supra note 149 (noting the broadly inclusive language used by
developing countries in defining what illnesses Members must address).
152. See supra note 109 (discussing the objectives of the Declaration).
153. Compare Declaration, supra note 26, paras. 1, 5(c) (modifying public
health with the clause "HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics")
with id. para. 4 (stating simply that Members should have the ability to enact
measures that "protect public health" and "promote access to medicines").
154. See id. paras. 1-5 (defining public health in several different ways).
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situation, a WTO Panel would need to interpret the term "public
health" within TRIPs. 
55
1. Legal Status of the Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and
Public Health
A WTO Panel interpreting TRIPs must look to the words of the
treaty. 156 The Panel will consider secondary materials in its analysis
only if a textual analysis yields an ambiguous result.'" Therefore, to
interpret the term "public health," a Panel must first decide whether
VCLT Article 31 mandates that the Declaration be considered part of
the treaty text or simply supplementary material.'
The AB in India-Mailbox stated that negotiating history is
inappropriate in a VCLT Article 31 analysis.'5 9 This same AB did not
preclude the use of other WTO material as part of a VCLT Article 31
ordinary meaning analysis. 60 When interpreting GATT Article
XX(b), the AB in U.S.-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products ("Shrimp Turtle 1') deliberately considered WTO
material outside of the treaty text as part of a VCLT Article 31
ordinary meaning analysis.' 6' This fact is important to determining
155. See id. (allowing interpretation disputes to be brought before a WTO
panel).
156. See hIdia-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 45 (noting the AB's reasoning
that the ordinary meaning analysis requires a treaty interpreter to look to words in
the four comers of the treaty).
157. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 32 (outlining that use of supplementary
materials when interpreting a treaty is acceptable if a VCLT Article 31 analysis
leaves the term's meaning "ambiguous or obscure").
158. See Canada-Generic, supra note 88, para. 7.13 (describing supplementary
material as a secondary consideration when interpreting a treaty).
159. See India-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 45 (stating that under a proper
31 analysis only expectations grounded in the treaty need consideration).
160. See id. (disallowing the importation of words and concepts from outside the
treaty, without indicating what exactly the treaty includes).
161. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 12, 1998), para.
130 (looking outside of the GATT to other "modem international conventions and
declarations" when performing a VCLT Article 31 ordinary meaning analysis of
the term "exhaustible natural resources") available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/58ABR.DOC (last visited July
11,2002).
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the status of the Declaration because among the WTO material the
AB in Shrimp-Turtle I considered was a decision of Ministers at
Marrakesh.162 Furthermore, the AB noted that it found this decision
"most significant" to its interpretation of the WTO agreement. 6
Finally, the WTO acknowledges that Panels are not experts in all
subject matters and consequently, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU") allows Panels to seek information from "any
relevant source. ' 164 As recently as 2001, the AB in European
Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos- Containing
Products ("EU Asbestos") affirmed the lower Panel's consideration
of non-WTO scientific experts, documentation, and relevant
intergovernmental organizations' findings when attempting to define
a health risk. 165 As a result, a Panel would most likely consider the
Declaration primary material and therefore essential in providing
context for the purposes of a VCLT Article 31 ordinary meaning
analysis. 66
162. See id. para. 154 (noting the Decision of Ministers at Marrakesh to
establish a permanent committee relating to trade and environment).
163. See id. (stating that the decision to establish a trade and environment
committee was "most significant" in clarifying the "objectives of WTO Members
with respect to the relationship between trade and the environment").
164. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement o/
Disputes, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) (outlining the procedures a panel must
undertake in order to gather technical advice and information). This Article
specifies that a panel has the "right to seek information and technical advice from
any individual or body it deems appropriate." Id. It does not specify what weight a
panel must accord to such technical information. Id.
165. See WTO Appellate Body, European Communities - Measures /I , lcting
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS 135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 200 1), paras. 159-62
[hereinafter EU Asbestos] (holding that Appellate Body should not overturn the
decision of the Panel to consider various pieces of scientific evidence unless Panel
clearly "exceeded the bounds of its discretion"), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/135ABR.doc (last visited July
11, 2002). France banned imports of asbestos based on grounds that measure
protected citizens from health risks posed by asbestos. Id. para. 164.
166. See supra notes 156-165 and accompanying text (analyzing the weight AB
or Panel would accord to Declaration in WTO dispute settlement process).
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2. Article 31 Analysis of "Public Health"
Applying the principles outlined in VCLT Article 31 (1), the Panel
would first look at the "ordinary" meaning of the term "public
health.' ' 67 Although the India-Mailbox AB failed to provide detailed
guidance on this step, 68 the Panel in Canada-Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products ("Canada-Generic") indicated that the
common dictionary definition would be an appropriate point of
reference. 69 The dictionary definition of public health encompasses
the health of the community generally. 170 Finding the dictionary
definition to be vague and indefinite, a reasonable Panel would
determine the term's ordinary meaning by looking at its context and
reading it in light of the object and purpose of TRIPs. 7 '
In the contextual portion of a VCLT Article 31 analysis of "public
health," a Panel would first look to the surrounding treaty
provisions. 72 The inquiry would also examine the preamble or
principles of TRIPS in order to incorporate the object and purpose of
TRIPs into their interpretation. 7 3 Accordingly, public health event B,
167. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 31 (explaining the requirements of a "good
faith" effort to interpret a treaty).
168. See India-Mailbox Panel, supra note 96, para. 7.25 (providing a one line
statement on the interpretation of "means" without providing any reasoning for
that conclusion); hIdia-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 55 (agreeing with Panel's
conclusion that ordinary meaning of "means" was not definitive from the term
itself).
169. See Canada-Generic, supra note 88, paras. 7.30. 7.54 (indicating that
ordinary meaning of the words "limited" and "normal" is found in the dictionary).
170. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF TIlE ENGLIS11
LANGUAGE: UNABRIDGED 1836 (1993) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY]
(defining public health as the "protection and improvement of community health").
171. See India-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 55 (concluding that "means"
should be read in light of context, object, and purpose of TRIPs because ordinary
meaning from terms themselves was unclear).
172. See id. para. 56 (reasoning that surrounding subsections, (b) and (c),
provide context for the meaning of term in subsection (a)); Canada-Generic, supra
note 88, paras. 7.31, 7.32, 7.36 (determining the meaning of "limited exceptions"
in TRIPs Article 30 by referencing the rights affected in TRIPs Article 28.1).
173. See India-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 57 (noting that the Panel's
definition of means was correct in part because it was consistent with the object
and purpose of TRIPs). The AB quoted language from the TRIPs Preamble stating
"adequate" and "effective" intellectual property protection as one of the objectives
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from the above hypothetical, would have to cause a national
emergency or disrupt sectors vital to the socio-economic welfare of'
the nation for country A to have a valid basis to issue a compulsory
license. 74  However, while this reading may elucidate some
characteristics of a valid public health event, 75 a proper VCLT
Article 31 analysis would necessarily take into consideration certain
documents relating to TRIPs and public health. 76
Therefore, a reasonable treaty interpreter would justifiably expand
the VCLT Article 31 inquiry to include other relevant WTO
material,' 77 especially directly applicable material such as the
of TRIPs. Id. See also Canada-Generic, supra note 88, para. 7.26 (taking into
account the principles of TRIPs as described in Articles 7 and 8).
Obviously, the exact scope of Article 30's authority will depend on the
specific meaning given to its limiting conditions. The words of those
conditions must be examined with particular care on this point. Both the
goals and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be
borne in mind when doing so as well as those of other provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement which indicate its object and purposes.
Id.
174. See TRIPs, supra note 17, arts. 7, 8, 31(b) (outlining pre-conditions to
Members exercising flexibilities). Members should design their domestic laws to
address both intellectual property interests and social and economic welfare. 1d.
art. 7. Members may use flexibilities to address public health events that adversely
affect socio-economic sectors. Id. art. 8. In the event of a national emergency, a
Member may authorize a license to a third party to quell the emergency. Id. art.
31(b).
175. See id. (reading the term "public health" in light of the instances when
TRIPs permits Members to use flexibilities).
176. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (quoting language from VCLT
that demonstrates that VCLT Articles 31(2) and 3 1(3) mandate consideration of
agreements beyond the strict terms of the treaty, the preamble, and the annexes
when performing an ordinary meaning analysis); supra notes 164-65 and
accompanying text (discussing a Panel's potential use of material beyond treaty
text for an ordinary meaning analysis).
177. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text (noting the incorporation of
WTO material other than treaty text into a VCLT ordinary meaning analysis); see
also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 311-12 (concluding that this incorporation is
valid despite the fact that a Declaration at a Ministerial Conference does not
technically fall within the five official ways to modify or set new trade rules or
policy, according to the WTO charter, including official "interpretations"). A
reasonable treaty interpreter may regard the Declaration as an agreement within the
meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Id. Compare Declaration, supra
note 26, paras. 4-5 (setting forth negotiated language regarding the proper
interpretation of certain TRIPs provisions), with VCLT, supra note 89, art.
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Declaration.'78 Unfortunately this also presents some difficulties.
Specifically, paragraphs 1 and 5(c) of the Declaration seemingly
define a "public health" event as an epidemic,' but paragraph 4
makes no effort to narrow this focus to anything less than public
health concerns as a whole. 80
However, the Declaration reaffirms and reemphasizes the values
expressed in TRIPs, that while the public good is important,
ultimately TRIPs seeks to promote intellectual property
protections. 181 As such, a Panel would adopt a narrower
interpretation of "public health" and decide that the ordinary
meaning of the term in its context, and in light of the object and
purpose of TRIPs, denotes an epidemic. 8 2
Finally, while a dictionary definition of epidemic serves as a
starting point,'83 a Panel, acting similarly to the one in EU
Asbestos,"' would probably look to international health
organizations such as the World Health Organization ("WHO") for
current scientifically accepted characteristics and examples of
31(3)(a) (stating that "any subsequent agreement" that concerns treaty
interpretation or the application of treaty provisions "shall be taken into account").
178. See generally, Declaration, supra note 26 (guiding Members on how to
interpret TRIPs provisions in order to address public health concerns).
179. See supra note 153 (discussing the modification of the term "public health"
in paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Declaration).
180. See id. (noting the absence of representative diseases and the phrase "other
epidemics" in paragraph 4 of the Declaration).
181. Compare TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 7 (commenting on the importance of
the "protection and enforcement of intellectual property ... in a manner conducive
to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations"), and
id. art. 8 (stating that "Members may... adopt measures necessary to protect
public health ... provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of
this Agreement"), with Declaration, supra note 26, paras. 1, 3 (recognizing the
"gravity of the public health problems," but also recognizing that "intellectual
property protection is important for the development of new medicines").
182. See Declaration, supra note 26, paras. 1, 5 (defining public health events
with specific terms, including epidemic).
183. See generally WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 170, at 762 (defining an
epidemic as "affecting or tending to affect many persons within a community, area,
or region at one time").
184. See EU Asbestos, supra note 165, paras. 159-62 (finding the Panel's
consideration of non-WTO expert evidence permissible).
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epidemics.185 Public health event B would qualify as an epidemic if
the population of country A suffers from a disease in proportions not
normally occurring." 6
Most significantly, "an epidemic is a temporary increase in
prevalence" in disease.' 87 Accordingly, the manufacture of medicines
to address the epidemic, pursuant to a compulsory license, will also
be temporary.'88 This result corresponds with the spirit of the TRIPs
provisions permitting exceptions to patent protection.' 89
Assuming that public health event B is considered an epidemic,
the next issue is whether country A, due to a lack of manufacturing
capacity, could issue a compulsory license to pharmaceutical
manufacturers outside its borders to produce drug C and supply
country A.
E. COMPULSORY LICENSING FOR COUNTRIES LACKING
ADEQUATE MANUFACTURING CAPACITIES: VIENNA CONVENTION
ARTICLE 31 ANALYSIS OF THE TRIPS ARTICLE 31 "THIRD PARTY"
Paragraph 6 of the Declaration specifically recognizes that even if
a public health event warrants a compulsory license, some Members
do not have pharmaceutical manufacturers with the production
185. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
expert evidence to derive an accurate contemporary meaning of a term).
186. See genet-ally World Health Organization, Department of Conmunicable
Disease Surveillance and Response, Hepatitis A, WHO/CDS/CSR/EDC/2000.7
(2000) (defining an epidemic as "an outbreak of disease such that for a limited
period a significantly greater number of persons in a community or region suffer
from it than is normally the case"), available at http://www.who.int/emc-
documents/hepatitis/docs/whocdscsredc2007.pdf/whocdscsredc2007.pd f (last
visited July 11, 2002).
187. See id. (noting that the "outbreak of disease" is "temporary" in nature).
188. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 31 (b) (stating that nations issue compulsory
licenses for medicine in emergencies that require quick and temporary action).
189. See id. art. 30 (specifying that Members may provide "limited exceptions to
the exclusive rights conferred by a patent"); id. art. 3 1(c) (stating that "the scope
and duration of [other uses of the subject matter of a patent] shall be limited"): id.
art. 31(g) (indicating that the compulsory license should be terminated when the
"circumstances which led to it cease to exist").
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capability to meet the population's needs.' The WTO Ministers
instructed the TRIPs Council to find a solution to this problem by the
end of 2002.19' This section argues that foreign drug manufacturers
should be permitted to supply another Member country with
pharmaceuticals, pursuant to the issuance of a compulsory license by
that Member in need.192
TRIPs Article 31, although it does not use the term "compulsory
license," is generally accepted as the primary TRIPs provision
authorizing the issuance of compulsory licenses. 93 Under this
provision, third parties approved by the government may undertake
uses of patented subject matter,' 94 including the manufacturing,
marketing, and selling of such matter.'9 5 TRIPs Article 31, on its
face, does not indicate that the term "third parties" should be
construed to exclude foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers."
The principle of territoriality, however, currently functions to
exclude non-domestic manufacturers from inclusion within the term
"third parties."' 97 The principle of territoriality prevents any Member
190. See Declaration, supra note 26, para. 6 (recognizing that "Members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPs
Agreement").
191. See id. (providing a deadline for the solution).
192. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 31 (outlining specific restrictions on the use
of patented products that are not authorized by the patent holder).
193. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 63, at 73 (observing that TRIPs Article 31
provides the framework under which WTO Members can grant compulsory
licenses).
194. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 31 (stating that "third parties authorized by
the government" may make use of patented products other than those authorized
by the patent holder).
195. See id. art. 28 (noting the patent holder's exclusive rights to the "making,"
"selling," or "offering for sale" of the patented product). TRIPs Article 31 permits
a third party to perform these rights without the patent holder's permission. M. art.
31.
196. See id. art. 31 (lacking a definition of the term "third parties" that
specifically excludes foreign entities).
197. See Communication from the European Communities and Their Member
States to the TRIPS Council: Concept Paper for Approaches Relating to
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
para. 7 (Mar. 2002) [hereinafter Communication from EU] (asserting that WTO
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country from interfering with the rights granted to a patent holder in
another Member country. 198 Territoriality is grounded in the notion
that every government has sovereignty within its borders or
territories. 199 Members have retained their sovereign powers in the
area of intellectual property rights by controlling the integration of
TRIPs obligations into a Member's legal framework.00 Significantly,
an inventor must seek a patent from each Member country in which
he desires protection.20'
On the other hand, a Member granting a compulsory license
suspends a patent holder's protections in that Member's country." 2
Members with insufficient manufacturing capacities cannot grant compulsory
licenses to foreign manufacturers because of the principle of territoriality), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/trips-doha.htm (last visited July 11, 2002).
198. See id. (concluding that Members with insufficient manufacturing
capacities cannot issue compulsory licenses to export to foreign entities). Such an
action would interfere with patent protection granted in the exporting Member's
country and violate the principle of territoriality. Id.
199. See FREDERICK ABBOTT ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SYSTEM: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 602 (1999) (commenting that
"the sovereignty of each national government within its own territory [is the]
paramount principle by which the international legal and political order was
constituted").
200. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. I (directing the nature and scope of
obligations upon WTO Members under TRIPs).
Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members
may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their domestic law more
extensive protection than is required by this Agreement .... Members shall
be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions
of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.
Id.
201. See ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 199, at 602 (stating that under the concept
of territoriality, a "creator must obtain protection in each territory where protection
is considered necessary"). Historically, intellectual property rights have been
granted by and only have effect within the territories of a single nation-state. Id.
See also John Gladstone Mills III, A Transnational Patent Convention .br the
Acquisition and Enforcement of International Rights, 84 J. PAT. & TRADIMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 83, 92 (2002) (maintaining that companies and inventors who desire
patent protection for their products in foreign nations "must file and perfect a
separate patent application in each country where their product is likely to be sold.
licensed, or produced").
202. See supra notes 193-195 and accompanying text (discussing how a
compulsory license allows a third party to exercise the exclusive rights that a
patent holder obtained pursuant to the grant of a patent).
1334 [17:1299
FUTURE OF COMPULSOR Y LICENSING
The current legal framework of TRIPs prohibits a Member
government from granting a compulsory license to a manufacturer in
a foreign Member's territory, because doing so interferes with the
inventor's patent rights in that foreign Member country. - 3 This type
of interference constitutes a violation of the principle of
territoriality. 204
However, scholars have questioned the relevance of this principle
in an increasingly international and interdependent economic and
political environment.205 Indeed, simply the assent of a nation-state to
a binding international treaty or agreement sacrifices some of the
nation's sovereign power.20 6 Furthermore, multinational agreements
on patents such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT"),207 regional
patent systems such as the European Patent Office ("EPO"), °s and
international agreements such as TRIPs, demonstrate nations'
willingness to cede certain sovereign powers in the area of patents. -°
203. See Communication from EU, supra note 197, para. 7 (stating that
"Members can not [sic] grant a compulsory license [sic] to a foreign manufacturer,
because the patent covering the product in the other country is independent from
the patent in the former country").
204. See id. (noting the impermissibility of a Member granting a compulsory
license to a foreign entity "by virtue of the principle of territoriality of patent
protection").
205. See ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 199, at 603 (analyzing the continuing value
of the principle of territoriality within the framework of international intellectual
property rights agreements). Commentators observe that many present and future
challenges to the principle of territoriality exist. Id. See also JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 369-70 (2000) (questioning the emphasis placed on
sovereignty in the current era, where international agreements abound).
206. See JACKSON, supra note 205, at 369 (suggesting that when countries agree
to international treaties and agreements, they agree to give up some of their
sovereign power to the international community).
207. Patent Cooperation Treaty, With Regulations, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T.
7645 [hereinafter PCT]. See also Mills, supra note 201. at 92 (observing that the
Patent Cooperation Treaty provides an international system for filing patent
applications).
208. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270
[hereinafter EPC].
209. See Mills, supra note 201, at 88 (discussing the powers of the PCT to
establish priority dates, the EPC to grant regional patents, and TRIPs to set
internationally binding minimum standards); see also Michael N. Meller,
Principles of Patentability and Some Other Basics for a Global Patent System, 83
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Consequently, the principle of territoriality is in a state of flux. A
VCLT Article 31 analysis of the TRIPs Article 31 term "third party"
supports a further paring down of the territoriality principle to
include compulsory licensing to foreign entities. 10
Applying Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the term "third
party" should be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning,
in its context, and in light of its object and purpose.2 ' Using the
dictionary definition as a starting point, a third party is "one who is
not a party to a[n] ... agreement . . . but who is somehow involved
in the transaction."'212 In the case of a patented product, the patent is
the agreement between the government and the patent holder.213 A
foreign drug manufacturer meets this definition of a third party
because, although not party to the patent, its right to access that
patented product is restricted for the term of the patent.214
Furthermore, reading the term "third party" in context, beginning
with the surrounding provisions, a treaty interpreter would not find
any restrictions limiting "other use" to domestic parties.21 5
Among the various conditions placed on "other use" under TRIPs
Article 31, the most pertinent to this discussion may be TRIPs
Article 31(f).2 16 This subsection requires that patented products
manufactured pursuant to Article 31 are directed "predominantly"
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 359 (2001) (discussing the importance of a
uniform global patent system to global trade and the economy).
210. See VCLT, supra note 89, art. 31 (stating the guidelines for interpretation
of treaties like TRIPs).
211. See id. (outlining the general rule of interpretation for international
treaties).
212. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (7th ed. 1999) (providing the most
current definition of a third party as understood within the legal system).
213. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at I (characterizing the patent system
as a "bargain" whereby the inventor discloses a technology in exchange for
exclusive rights to that technology).
214. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 28 (stating the exclusive rights associated
with the grant of a patent). A patent holder can prohibit a third party from
"making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" the patented product. id.
215. See id. arts. 28, 30, 31 (lacking any explicit or implicit limitations on the
location of the party conducting the "other use" under TRIPs Article 31).
216. See id. art. 31(f) (specifying that the "other use" under TRIPs Article 31
"shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
Member authorizing such use").
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towards supplying the domestic marketplace of the authorizing
Member government.1 7 In other words, the terms of the compulsory
license should not allow the licensee to sell to other markets and go
beyond the purpose that precipitated the issuance of the license.21 '
Interpreted in this manner, TRIPs Article 31 () places a general
restriction on third party manufacturers, regardless of their domicile,
to negotiate license terms that provide broad distribution rights. -2'9
Article 31(f), along with the other Article 31 conditions, provides
protection against third party misuse of a compulsory license.22
Finally, a full contextual analysis under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention would be incomplete without considering the
Declaration.?' The Declaration indicates that its drafters expect that
the exercise of flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing, will play
an integral role in quelling epidemics that afflict the populations of
developing and least developed Member countries . 2 2 Therefore, if
the goal of TRIPs is to protect intellectual property "in a manner
217. See id. (suggesting that a drug manufactured pursuant to a compulsory
license must be for the Member country authorizing such use).
218. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 3 1(c) (explicitly stating that the *'scope" of
the other use "shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized"); see
also id. art. 31(f) (suggesting that the purpose in granting a compulsory license
must be to primarily provide the domestic market of the authorizing member with
a supply of the patented product). Read together, a Panel could legitimately infer
that as soon as a third party stops primarily supplying the domestic market, then
the purpose for which the license was authorized has ceased to exist and the license
should be terminated. Id. art. 31 (c), (f).
219. See id. art. 31(f) (restricting the possible markets for the patented product).
220. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 31 (setting forth various restrictions on
"other use," including a compulsory license). The proposed user must negotiate
with the patent holder. Id. art. 31 (b). The scope and duration of the license must be
limited to the original purpose. Id. art. 3 1(c). The license shall be non-exclusive.
Id. art. 31(d). The license shall be non-assignable. Id. art. 31(e). If the
circumstances that justified a Member's issuance of the license cease to exist, then
the license shall be terminated. Id. art. 31 (g).
221. See supra notes 156-166 and accompanying text (analyzing the legal status
of the Declaration).
222. See Declaration, supra note 26, paras. 1-6 (suggesting how Members could
issue compulsory licenses to address epidemics like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis); see also hIdia-Mailbox AB, supra note 87, para. 45 (stating that the
legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are evidenced in the text).
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conducive to social and economic welfare, 223 then the WTO should
not place barriers on Members lacking adequate domestic
manufacturing capacities to issue compulsory licenses to foreign
pharmaceutical manufactures. Furthermore, Members should not
assert the principle of territoriality against the aforementioned
compulsory licenses.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Patent laws, at their very cores, seek to promote the creation of'
new and innovative products and processes for the benefit of the
public.224 In the field of pharmaceuticals, patented products represent
some of the most significant advances in science and medicine.22'
Indeed, pharmaceutical companies have been able to develop
HIV/AIDS drug therapies that have been critical in transforming an
AIDS diagnosis from a "death warrant" '226 to a "treatable disease. '"227
The grant of a patent is a bargained-for-exchange.228 In exchange for
informing the public of the invention, the government grants the
patent holder certain exclusive rights for a fixed period of time. 229
223. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 7 (outlining the objectives of the TRI's
Agreement).
224. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CIII. L. REV. 1017, 1021-22 (1989)
(characterizing patents as requiring the patentee to provide knowledge that will
contribute to the public warehouse).
225. See Papovich Testimony, supra note 64 (noting the importance of patent
protection to the emergence of medicines for AIDS and other catastrophic
diseases).
226. See James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AI)S
Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 727, 733 (2001) (noting that
"AIDS, contrary to the view that it is a death warrant, is a treatable disease.").
227. See id. (noting that drug treatment has "quadrupled the median survival
time" for those diagnosed with AIDS).
228. See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPs: The Pharmaceutical
Industiy Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules. and the
Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. IIA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1071 (1996) (explaining the exchange as the inventor's
immediate placement of the newly-created knowledge in the public domain for a
limited period in which the patent holder can use the patented knowledge).
229. See TRIPs, supra note 17, arts. 28, 29 (describing the rights granted to
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In drafting TRIPs, WTO Members recognized that under certain
circumstances exceptions to the patent holder's exclusive rights
would be necessary and appropriate..23' The WTO met in Doha to
provide guidance to Members because TRIPs failed to clearly define
the circumstances that would justify a Member's authorization of an
exception, such as a compulsory license.23 The Declaration is a good
first step in the new round of trade talks. -3 - Negotiating trade
ministers should keep in mind a number of recommendations when
debating what changes should be made to TRIPs.
A. ISSUE AN OFFICIAL INTERPRETATION ON PUBLIC HEALTH
First, Members must consider either an amendment or official
interpretive statement to incorporate the clarifications of TRIPs
negotiated at Doha. The Declaration would most likely be considered
primary material and used to provide context for a VCLT Article 31
ordinary meaning analysis of the term "public health".233 An
amendment or official interpretation, however, would be a stronger
binding legal document.3
patentees and what patentees must disclose in order to receive patents). The patent
holder gains a period of exclusive use of the subject matter pursuant to the grant of
a patent. Id.
230. See id. art. 30, 31 (outlining exceptions to patent rights); see also
Weissman, supra note 228, at 1099 (stating that TRIPs Articles 30 and 31 are two
important exceptions to the exclusive rights granted in TRIPs Article 28).
231. See DORA PRESS PACK, supra note 22, at 24 (noting that one objective of
the Doha Ministerial Conference was to clarify what measures Member
governments could undertake under TRIPs).
232. See, e.g., Frances Williams, WT7O Agrees to Launch New Global Trade
Round, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001 (providing account of concessions, negotiations,
various deals, and compromises made by trade ministers in Doha in order to launch
a new global trading round), available at
http://www.wto.ruL/en/news.asp?msg-id=349 (last visited July 11, 2002); Paul
Geitner, WTO to Launch New Trade Talks, PNLTV, Nov. 14, 2001 (reporting the
decision of WTO Members to launch new trade negotiations), at
http://www.pnltv.com/NewsStories/Nov%2015%20WTO%20to%20Launch%20N
ew0/o20Trade%20Talks.htm (last visited July 11, 2002).
233. See supra notes 156-166 and accompanying text (analyzing the legal status
of the Declaration).
234. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 311 (stating that under the WTO,
charter amendments and interpretations are two techniques for formulating new or
amended trade rules).
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An official interpretation, pursuant to Article IX (2) of the WTO
charter,235 might be the preferred choice. The streamlined amendment
procedure set forth in Article X(6) of the WTO charter would not
apply to changes that would potentially decrease patent protection,2m
such as those dealing with exceptions to exclusive rights.
Consequently, the more rigorous procedure set forth in Article X( 1)
of the WTO charter would apply.237
In light of this, an official interpretation is preferable to an
amendment because, while it does not carry the same weight as an
amendment,238 it is sufficient to formulate new policy. 29  A
procedure-laden method is not the optimal choice for clarifying
terms subject to rapid change and development, such as "public
health."
B. DESIGNATE WHO AS THE OFFICIAL ORGANIZATION TO
PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON TRIPS-RELATED IIEALTH
ISSUES
Second, without a more internally consistent and binding
statement, developed countries may continue to file WTO legal
challenges to domestic patent laws asserting a violation of TRIPs
standards. 40 Developed countries might allege that developing
countries exercised TRIPs flexibilities impermissibly by addressing
235. See WTO Agreement, supra note 18, art. IX:2 (discussing the authority and
procedure for interpretations).
236. See id. art. X:6 (stating that the formal acceptance process will be waived
for TRIPs amendments that meet the criteria set forth in TRIPs Article 71); TRIPs,
supra note 17, art. 71(2) (declaring that only amendments that increase protection
for rights granted are eligible for adoption in accordance with paragraph 6 of
Article X of the WTO charter).
237. See WTO Agreement, supra note 18, art. X:l (outlining the full formal
amendment procedure).
238. See id. art. IX.2 (suggesting that interpretations are of a lesser weight than
amendments by stating that "[interpretations] shall not be used in a manner that
would undermine Article X").
239. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 311 (noting that interpretations are
one way to enact new rules for trade policy).
240. See supra notes 153, 179-180 and accompanying texts (highlighting the
internal inconsistencies of the Declaration).
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public health concerns that are not widely accepted as epidemics. -4
While the WTO charter and AB decisions already acknowledge that
Panels may seek the guidance of outside experts, 2 2 the WHO should
be designated as the international organization from which Members
should seek guidance when determining the presence of an epidemic.
C. AMEND TRIPs ARTICLE 31 TERM "THIRD PARTY" TO INCLUDE
FOREIGN ENTITIES
Third, the ministers should consider amending TRIPs Article 31 to
include language stating that in the case where the Member issuing a
compulsory license lacks adequate manufacturing capacities, the
term "third party" may include foreign entities. The inclusion of this
type of language comports with the notion that Member governments
recognize the need to cede certain sovereign powers in the area of
patents, demonstrated by EPC and PCT systems.4 3
The text of TRIPs does not support an interpretation of the term
"third party" that would exclude foreign pharmaceutical
manufacturers.2 " In fact, a clear acknowledgment that "third party"
includes foreign entities would be in accordance with the spirit of a
Declaration seeking to help developing and least-developing
Member countries overcome the epidemics that afflict their people.245
D. PROVIDE AN EXEMPTION TO TRIPS ARTICLE 3 1 (F)
If Members insist on adhering to territoriality, then trade ministers
should consider a system in which Members lacking manufacturing
capacities issue compulsory licenses for importation of needed
241. See id. (suggesting that internal consistencies may lead to varying
interpretations and therefore, legal challenges).
242. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text (providing the authority
for using non-WTO material in VCLT ordinary meaning analysis).
243. See supra notes 205-209 and accompanying text (discussing the current
state of the concepts of sovereignty and territoriality in general, and specifically
their future significance to patents).
244. See supra notes 190-223 and accompanying text (concluding that, in light
of the changing significance of sovereignty as it relates to patents, the term "third
party" in TRIPs Article 31 should include foreign entities).
245. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (concluding that the Declaration
allows Members to use compulsory licenses to address epidemics).
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pharmaceuticals, and exporting Members concurrently issue
compulsory licenses for export.246 According to this scenario, two
compulsory licenses would be issued with each license having to
separately meet the requirements of TRIPs Article 3 1.247 In addition,
TRIPs Article 31(f)'s limitation, requiring compulsory licenses to be
used "predominantly for the supply" of the authorizing Member's
territory, would apply. 248 Any compulsory license for export would
be ineffective because TRIPs Article 31(f) would only allow for a
"non-predominant proportion of the production" to be exported.4'
Therefore, trade ministers should consider amending TRIPs to
include an exemption clause that would suspend the TRIPs Article
31(f) requirement when a Member issues a compulsory license for
export in order to supply another Member that lacks adequate
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities. 25 0 However, Members
would still be required to undertake the other inquiries set forth in
246. See Communication from EU, supra note 197, paras. 7, 8 (suggesting a
compulsory licensing system for Members lacking adequate pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacities where Members in need issue compulsory licenses for
import and other Members willing to supply medicines issue compulsory licenses
for export).
247. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing the various TRIPs
Article 31 limitations on the issuance of a compulsory license).
248. See Paul Vandoren, TRIPs in the Context of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration, Speech at Hong Kong VIP Visitors' Programme (Jan. 6, 2002)
(indicating that TRIPs Article 31(f) would function to limit compulsory licenses
for export), at http://europa.eu.int/comntrade/speeches-articles/spvdo0o 1. htin
(last visited July 11, 2002).
249. See id. (reasoning that Members lacking adequate production capacity
could not truly benefit from compulsory licenses issued by foreign Members to
their domestic manufacturers because TRIPs Article 3 1() would require that a
predominant proportion of the manufactured product by the foreign Member's
manufacturer be supplied to that Member's population). Thus, the foreign Member
could "only export a non-predominant proportion of the production under
compulsory license." Id. See also Communication from EU, supra note 197, para.
8 (stating that compulsory licenses for export would "not be workable because of
the limitation under 31(f) of the TRIPs Agreement, which stipulates that 'a
predominant part' of the production under a compulsory license must remain on
the domestic market of the Member granting the license").
250. See Communicationfiom EU, supra note 197, para. 21 (suggesting that an
exception clause to TRIPs Article 31(f) should state "that Article 31( ( does not
apply to compulsory licenses granted in view of supplying a poor country with a
product needed to address serious public health problems").
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TRIPs Article 31.2 51 These inquiries include determining "adequate
remuneration" for the patent holder, 252 whether sufficient efforts have
been expended to obtain a voluntary license,2'2" and whether a
national emergency is present.254
Both the EU and public health groups have indicated the
disadvantages of incorporating an exemption clause for TRIPs
Article 3 1(f).255 Their opinion is that the separate inquiries needed for
both import and export compulsory licenses would be duplicative
and inefficient. 56 In addition, another concern is that some Members
251. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (outlining at least five other
conditions that exist, in addition to TRIPs Article 3 1(f), relating to a Member's
issuance of a compulsory license).
252. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 31 (h) (specifying that a patent holder, whose
patent has been compulsory licensed, is entitled to "adequate remuneration in the
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the
authorization").
253. See id. art. 31(b) (emphasizing that uses of a patented product unauthorized
by the patent holder are only allowed if the Member government has "made efforts
to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable
period of time").
254. See id. (indicating that mandated negotiations with the patent holder may
be waived in the event of a national emergency).
255. See Communication from EU, supra note 197, para. 8 (pointing out the
disadvantage behind a TRIPs Article 31(f) exemption clause); Press Release,
Health Gap, U.S. Post-Doha Conditions Can Kill (Mar. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Post-
Doha Conditions] (outlining the shortcomings of an informal U.S. solution that
entails providing an exemption clause to TRIPs Article 31(f), but retains the
remaining limitations in TRIPs Article 31 (f)), at
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200203040443.html (last visited July 11,
2002).
256. See Post-Doha Conditions, supra note 255 (concluding that a TRIPs Article
31(f) exemption clause would still require lengthy and costly administrative
procedures for the issuance of compulsory licenses for export). Compulsory
licenses for export would require Members to negotiate with the patent holder in
an attempt to achieve a voluntary license on commercially reasonable terms. Id.
Such negotiations involve bureaucratic and administratively burdensome
procedures. Id. Furthermore, the exporting Member, that is the country not in need,
would be required to make a determination of the public health need and
manufacturing capacity in the Member issuing a compulsory license for import. Id.
As result of the aforementioned issues, Members with manufacturing capacities to
supply those Members who lack them may simply be deterred from issuing a
compulsory license for export. Id.
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may not approve an amendment to the text of TRIPs.117 As a result,
both the EU and public health groups have suggested a declaration
providing a broader interpretation of TRIPs Article 30's exceptions
to patent rights. 8
E. ISSUE A FORMAL INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT CLARIFYING
TRIPS ARTICLE 30 EXCEPTIONS
The trade ministers should consider issuing a formal interpretative
statement on TRIPs Article 30 allowing Members to supply patented
pharmaceuticals to other Members that lack adequate manufacturing
capacities but have issued a compulsory license for import."' The
key difference between this recommendation and providing an
exception to TRIPs Article 31(f) is that the former does not require
the issuance of two separate compulsory licenses.26 ° Consequently,
the exporting Member exercising the TRIPs Article 30 exceptions is
257. See Vandoren, supra note 248 (suggesting that a reluctance to amend
TRIPs prevails among Members).
258. See Communication from EU, supl-a note 197, para. 19 (suggesting an
interpretation of TRIPs Article 30's exceptions that would "allow production flor
export, to certain countries and under certain conditions, of products needed to
combat serious public health problems"); Letter from Mgdecins Sans Fronti~rcs et
al., to TRIPs Council 1 (Jan. 28, 2002) (urging the WTO to consider an
interpretation of TRIPs Article 30's exceptions as a solution to the issue of*
production for export), at www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo-e/joint-trips.doc
(last visited July 11, 2002).
259. See Communication from EU, supra note 197, para. 28 (suggesting as an
alternative to a TRIPs Article 31 solution that Members issue a clarifying
declaration on TRIPs Article 30's exceptions clause).
To this end WTO Members could adopt a declaration stating that a WTO
Member may, in accordance with Article 30 of the TRIPs Agreement,
provide that the manufacture, on its territory, of a patented product, without
the authorization [sic] of the right holder, is lawful when the tolerated
production is meant to supply another country which has granted a
compulsory licence [sic] for the import and sale of the product concerned in
its territory in order to deal with a serious public health problem.
Id.
260. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (noting that TRIPs Article 31
authorizes and places conditions on compulsory licenses).
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not restrained by TRIPs Article 31's limitations on compulsory
licenses.26'
The benefits of an approach that takes advantage of TRIPs Article
30 exceptions include efficiency and the speed with which Members
lacking adequate manufacturing capacities can receive needed
pharmaceuticals.262 Members suffering from public health epidemics
would not have to endure a prolonged administrative procedure
before being able to receive imports of essential medicines. 63
Additionally, this approach would expand upon already existing
language in TRIPs,264 making it more palatable to many Members. '65
F. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE MUST BE IMPLEMENTED
Under either a TRIPs Article 31 or Article 30 based remedy, trade
ministers should implement procedures which guarantee that
exported pharmaceutical products are used for their authorized
266 tipurposes.- To this end, trade ministers should discuss steps that
ensure that the entirety, not just a "predominant" portion, of
261. See Post-Doha Conditions, supra note 255 (suggesting a TRIPs Article 30-
based solution is superior to TRIPs Article 31 because it is not subject to the
various compulsory licensing conditions imposed by TRIPs Article 31).
262. See Letter from M~decins Sans Fronti~res et al., supra note 258, at I
(supporting a TRIPs Article 30 solution because it would be administratively
simple, would avoid double compensation for the patent holder, and would avoid
the need for two separate compulsory licenses); see also Post-Doha Conditions,
supra note 255 (suggesting that a TRIPs Article 30-based remedy would be more
efficient than a TRIPs Article 31 (f) solution).
263. See Post-Doha Conditions, supra note 255 (suggesting that the reduced
administrative barriers under a TRIPs Article 30 approach would result in speedy
supply of needed pharmaceuticals and thus, save lives).
264. See Connunicationfronz EU, supra note 197, para. 30 (*The advantage of
this [TRIPs Article 30 declaration] approach would be that it could fit within the
flexibility offered by the existing TRIPs Agreement, without there being a need to
go through a procedure to amend any of its provisions.").
265. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (suggesting that a solution
based on existing language would generally be more acceptable to a majority of
Members than a solution that required an amendment to TRIPs).
266. See Conniunication from EU, supra note 197, paras. 23, 31 (advocating
strong safeguards, under either a TRIPs Article 31 or Article 30 approach, to
ensure that objective of supplying Members in need is achieved and that patent
rights are not undermined).
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pharmaceuticals manufactured pursuant to a compulsory license for
export are sent to the Member in need.2 67 In addition, Member
representatives should implement restrictions against the re-export of
pharmaceuticals from the Member in need.2 6 Both the above
recommendations are in accordance with the general principle that
exceptions to patent rights should be limited in scope. 691
Amendments or declarations to TRIPs that expand exceptions to
patent rights in combination with safeguards to ensure limited
exceptions will help preserve the balance between patent rights and
the public good.
CONCLUSION
The Declaration on Public Health and TRIPs issued in Doa,
Quatar, created, rather than definitively solved, issues related to
compulsory licensing. In the coming round of trade talks, WTO
Members must come to a clear understanding on the issues of public
health and compulsory licensing for export. Developing countries
need to accept limits on what constitutes a "public health" concern,
while developed countries need to accept a more expansive
definition of "third party." The twenty-five million men, women, and
children suffering from HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa are
awaiting an answer.
267. See id. para. 31 (suggesting a requirement that the "entirety of tile
production allowed under the [TRIPs] Article 30-exception must be imported to
the Member having granted a licence [sic] for the sole purpose of the compulsory
licence [sic]"). See also Vandoren, supra note 248 (suggesting a pre-condition on
production for export as requiring that the "entire" amount of pharmaceutical
produced for export to a Member lacking adequate manufacturing capacity be used
"solely" to supply the Member in need).
268. See Communication from EU, supra note 197, paras. 24, 31 (asserting the
need for safeguards against patented pharmaceuticals that are manufactured and
exported to a Member in need from being re-exported from either (1) the exporting
Member or (2) the importing Member). See also Vandoren, supra note 248
(emphasizing that "re-export of any part of the production would be allowed from
the benefiting Member's territory").
269. See TRIPs, supra note 17, art. 30 (stating that "[m]embers may provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent").
1346 [17:1299
